OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)
In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them.
First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
(2) Whether they differ generically?
(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?
(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
Saint Augustine says that “a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not.”
But a crime denotes a mortal sin.
Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus “to smile” is not opposed to “being dry”; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought.
In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus.
But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.
For sin, being a sickness of the soul, is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle.
Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end: and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of GOD alone, because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles.
Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles.
Wherefore such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable.
On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable.
These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases.
Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul.
Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
Saint Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory, enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins.
Venial sin is so called from “venia” [pardon].
Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that “penance makes every sin venial”: and this is called venial “from the result.”
Secondly, a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial “from the cause”: totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment.
It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now.
For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object.
For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object.
Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of GOD, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one’s neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus.
Sometimes, however, the sinner’s will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of GOD and one’s neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.
Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of the agent, it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of adultery.
In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief.
Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): “He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little.”
Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things.
Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it.
Accordingly an act of sin disposes to something in two ways.
First, directly, and thus it disposes to an act of like species.
In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species.
Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin.
Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto.
In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal.
Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus.
Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways.
First, so that the same identical act be at first a venial, and then a mortal sin.
This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically.
If, however, the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal.
This is possible, in so far as one may fix one’s end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end.
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin.
If this be taken as meaning that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin.
This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment.
It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing GOD, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states.
It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin.
Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act’s genus, because the subject always excels its accident.
If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said.
When we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act.
This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another man’s wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species.
The deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end.
Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference of the moral act.
Whether a mortal sin can become venial?
An eternal thing can never become temporal.
But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment.
Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin.
Now the imperfect can become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication.
On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act.
This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed.
OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)
We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?
(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by “wood,” “hay,” “stubble” (1 Cor. 3:12);
(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?
(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?
(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?
Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
It is written, (Eph. 5:27): “That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle,” on which the gloss says: “i.e., some grievous sin.”
Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
A stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude.
Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light.
Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on, but only hinders their acts.
On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness.
Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul.
If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.
Whether venial sins are suitably designated as “wood, hay, and stubble”?
Saint Paul says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, “shall be saved yet so as by fire,” so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting.
Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin.
Therefore these three signify venial sins.
Some have understood the “foundation” to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble.
But Saint Augustine disapproves of this explanation because, as Saint Paul says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, “shall not obtain the kingdom of GOD,” which signifies to be saved; whereas Saint Paul says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble “shall be saved yet so as by fire.” Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins.
Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under GOD however, so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to GOD.
But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of GOD, and one’s neighbor, wherefore they are designated by “gold,” “silver,” and “precious stones,” and consequently not by “wood,” “hay,” and “stubble.”
We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet he is saved for ever.
Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?
Every sin deserves some punishment.
But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Saint Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10).
Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity.
But venial sin does not change man’s state.
Therefore he could not sin venially.
It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence.
This, however, is not to be understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it.
Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point.
Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state.
We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally.
The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded.
Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher.
Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good; and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite.
Now, in the state of innocence, there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to GOD, as Saint Augustine says.
Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to GOD, which constitutes a mortal sin.
From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.
Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state.
But man could not sin venially in the primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
An angel’s intellect is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do.
Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles.
Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated, ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions.
Wherefore, an angel’s mind is not directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end.
Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin.
Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is GOD: wherefore all their acts are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them.
On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin of pride.
Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will.
This does not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them.
Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?
It is stated in Acts 10:34 that “GOD is not a respecter of persons.”
Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to another.
But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation.
Neither therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.
It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them.
This is evident for two reasons.
First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin.
Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers.
Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins.
Secondly, from the state of the sinner.
Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it.
Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so.
For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: “I obtained the mercy of GOD, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief”; whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?”
Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?
Man is punished for original sin in the children’s limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on; whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.
It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin.
The reason for this is because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically.
But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin.
Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself.
And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing that which is in his power to do.
Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.
